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Abstract What, if anything, is cognitive architecture and
how is it implemented in neural architecture? Focusing on
perceptual organization, this question is addressed by way
of a pluralist approach which, supported by metatheoreti-
cal considerations, combines complementary insights
from representational, connectionist, and dynamic systems
approaches to cognition. This pluralist approach starts from
a representationally inspired model which implements the
intertwined but functionally distinguishable subprocesses
of feedforward feature encoding, horizontal feature bind-
ing, and recurrent feature selection. As sustained by a
review of neuroscientific evidence, these are the subpro-
cesses that are believed to take place in the visual hierarchy
in the brain. Furthermore, the model employs a special
form of processing, called transparallel processing, whose
neural signature is proposed to be gamma-band synchro-
nization in transient horizontal neural assemblies. In neu-
roscience, such assemblies are believed to mediate binding
of similar features. Their formal counterparts in the model
are special input-dependent distributed representations,
called hyperstrings, which allow many similar features to
be processed in a transparallel fashion, that is, simulta-
neously as if only one feature were concerned. This form of
processing does justice to both the high combinatorial
capacity and the high speed of the perceptual organization
process. A naturally following proposal is that those tem-
porarily synchronized neural assemblies are ‘‘gnosons’’,
that is, constituents of flexible self-organizing cognitive
architecture in between the relatively rigid level of neurons
and the still elusive level of consciousness.
Keywords Cognitive architecture  Cognitive processing 
Distributed representations  Feature binding 
Neuronal synchronization  Perceptual organization
Introduction
The term cognitive architecture refers to computational
models of not only resulting behavior but also structural
properties of intelligent systems. These structural proper-
ties can be physical properties as well as more abstract
properties implemented in physical systems such as com-
puters and brains. There is no consensus about what these
structural properties should be, and indeed, many different
cognitive-architecture models have been proposed (for
extensive reviews and references, see, e.g., Langley et al.
2009; Sun 2004). These models differ, for instance, in
whether they involve fixed or flexible architectures, in what
forms of processing they allow (e.g., serial or parallel
processing), and the extent to which they are based on a set
of symbolic information-processing rules applied by one
central processor or rely on emergent properties of many
interacting processing units. Most models agree, however,
that a cognitive architecture is a parameter-free blueprint
for a system that acts like the human cognitive system as a
whole.
Cognitive-architecture models differ from cognitive
models and expert systems which focus on particular
competences such as language, concept learning, or prob-
lem solving. Even so, many cognitive-architecture models
seek compliance with higher (conscious) cognitive facul-
ties rather than with lower (nonconscious) faculties like
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visual perception. In this article, I do not pretend to present
a full-blown cognitive architecture, but I aim to contribute
to understanding the architecture of the human cognitive
system by discussing a neurally plausible algorithmic
model of perceptual organization.
To give a first gist, this model implements the inter-
twined but functionally distinguishable subprocesses of
feedforward feature encoding, horizontal feature binding,
and recurrent feature selection. As I sustain by a review of
neuroscientific evidence, these are the subprocesses that are
believed to take place in the visual hierarchy in the brain.
The model further employs a special form of processing,
called transparallel processing, whose neural signature is
proposed to be gamma-band synchronization in transient
neural assemblies. This is argued to lead to a picture of
how flexible self-organizing cognitive architecture might
be implemented in the neural architecture of the brain.
Next, by way of further introduction, I briefly sketch the
problem of perceptual organization, the presumed role of
neuronal synchronization in perceptual organization, and
the pluralist approach I adopt to arrive at this picture of
cognitive architecture.
Perceptual organization
Perceptual organization refers to the neuro-cognitive pro-
cess that takes the light in our eyes as input and that
enables us to perceive scenes as structured wholes con-
sisting of objects arranged in space (see Fig. 1). This
automatic process may seem to occur effortlessly, but by
all accounts, it must be very complex and yet very flexible.
To give a gist (following Gray 1999), multiple sets of
features at multiple, sometimes overlapping, locations in a
stimulus must be grouped simultaneously. This implies that
the process must cope with a large number of possible
combinations in parallel, which also suggests that these
possible combinations are engaged in a stimulus-dependent
competition between grouping criteria. This indicates that
the combinatorial capacity of the perceptual organization
process must be very high. This, together with its high
speed (it completes in the range of 100–300 ms), reveals
the truly impressive nature of the perceptual organization
process.
My algorithmic model was developed to account for
both the high combinatorial capacity and the high speed of
the perceptual organization process. To this end, it imple-
ments the earlier-mentioned subprocesses of feedforward
feature encoding, horizontal feature binding, and recurrent
feature selection. Most distinguishing, it employs this
special form of processing, called transparallel processing,
whose neural signature is proposed to be neuronal syn-
chronization. This issue is introduced next.
Neuronal synchronization
Neuronal synchronization is the phenomenon that neurons,
in transient assemblies, temporarily synchronize their
activity. Not to be confused with neuroplasticity which
involves changes in connectivity, such assemblies are
thought to arise when neurons shift their allegiance to
different groups by altering connection strengths (Edelman
1987), which may also imply a shift in the specificity and
function of neurons (Gilbert 1992). Both theoretically
(Milner 1974; von der Malsburg 1981) and empirically
(Eckhorn et al. 1988; Gray and Singer 1989), neuronal
synchronization has been associated with cognitive pro-
cessing, and 30–70 Hz gamma-band synchronization in
particular has been associated with feature binding in
perceptual organization.
As I discuss in section ‘‘The visual hierarchy’’, physical
properties of neuronal synchronization have been studied,
but thus far, it lacked a computational account explaining
what is being processed, and how. My algorithmic model
now suggests that those transient neural assemblies can be
conceived of as cognitive information processors—which I
call ‘‘gnosons’’ (i.e., fundamental particles of cognition) and
which I propose to be the constituents of flexible self-orga-
nizing cognitive architecture. The idea that cognition is a
dynamic process of self-organization is not new (see, e.g.,
Attneave 1982; Kelso 1995; Koffka 1935; Ko¨hler 1920;
Lehar, 2003; Wertheimer 1912, 1923), and the idea that those
assemblies are the building blocks of cognition is not new
either (see, e.g., Buzsa´ki 2006; Finkel et al. 1998). What my
model adds, however, is the idea that those assemblies are
involved in transparallel feature processing. As I discuss in
section ‘‘A representationally inspired algorithmic account’’,
this special form of processing is enabled by special input-
dependent distributed representations, called hyperstrings,
Yes No
No Yes
Fig. 1 Perceptual organization. Both images at the top can be
interpreted as 3-D cubes and as 2-D mosaics, but as indicated by
‘‘yes’’ and ‘‘no’’, humans preferably interpret the one at the left as a
3-D cube and the one at the right as a 2-D mosaic of triangles
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which allow one processor (also, e.g., a single computer) to
recode many similar features in one go, that is, simulta-
neously as if only one feature were concerned. This is key in
my account of the high combinatorial capacity and speed of
perceptual organization.
Transparallel processing is basically an idea about fea-
ture binding. The classical binding problem is often taken
to refer to binding of different features. This is a form of
binding which I rather would call integration (think of
Treisman and Gelade’s 1980, feature integration theory)
and which, in my model, is the result of feature selection.
Preceding this selection, however, there is also binding of
similar features, and this what neuronal synchronization
seems to mediate (see section ‘‘The visual hierarchy’’).
Binding of similar features may seem a limited basis to
focus on, but in my model, it enables a high combinatorial
capacity and speed which remain effective until selection
and integration (see section ‘‘A representationally inspired
algorithmic account’’). Furthermore, my notion of features
is broader than first-order features, like orientation, as
considered usually in neuroscience. I focus on second-
order features, such as symmetry and repetition, in terms of
correlations between elements in a stimulus. I do not think
this conflicts with existing neuroscientific evidence (cf.
Tyler et al. 2005), and pre-attentive detection of such
second-order features is believed to be an integral part of
the automatic perceptual organization process (Simon
1972; Tyler 1996; van der Helm and Leeuwenberg 1996;
Wagemans 1997).
Pluralist approaches
David Marr (1945–1980) probably would have been thril-
led by the present state of cognitive (neuro)science. When
he died, classical representational theory dominated the
research field, in which connectionism and dynamic sys-
tems theory (DST) had not yet gained the impact they have
nowadays. Even so, in his book Vision (Marr 1982/2010),
he envisioned a theory comprising three separate but
complementary levels of description of the visual system—
the computational, algorithmic, and implementational lev-
els—to which, as I argue in section ‘‘Towards a pluralist
account’’, representational, connectionist, and DST
approaches run sort of parallel. In line with Marr’s com-
plementarity idea, I argue further that insights from all
these three modeling approaches must be combined to
address the question of how cognitive architecture might be
implemented in the neural architecture of the brain.
It is true that, at least according to some, those three
modeling approaches exhibit differences in underlying
philosophy (e.g., DST proponents tend to reject the exis-
tence of representations), and they certainly reflect differ-
ent modeling stances. Roughly, representational theory
proposes that cognition relies on regularity extraction to get
structured mental representations; connectionism proposes
that it relies on activation spreading through a network
connecting pieces of information; and DST proposes that it
relies on dynamic changes in the brain’s neural state. Not
surprising therefore, during the past decades, many things
have been written for and against each of these three
approaches (see, e.g., Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988; Smo-
lensky 1988; van Gelder and Port 1995).
However, instead of thinking that these approaches are
mutually exclusive, I think they are complementary—pre-
cisely because they focus on different aspects. The idea
that intelligent systems need a pluralist approach is already
quite common in artificial intelligence research (cf. Dale
2008; Dale and Spivey 2005; Edelman 2008a; Jilk et al.
2008) and is gaining in acceptance in cognitive science (cf.
Abrahamsen and Bechtel 2006; Bem and Looren de Jong
2006; Kelley 2003; Lehar, 1999, 2003; Pavloski 2011;
Smith and Samuelson 2003). In this article, I aim to go
farther than just promoting this idea. My algorithmic model
was inspired by a representational approach, but I adopt a
pluralist approach to investigate how cognitive architecture
might be implemented in neural architecture. Pivotal in this
investigation is the phenomenon of neuronal synchroniza-
tion which, thus far, has been studied in DST, less so in
connectionism, and to my knowledge not in representa-
tional theory. Also pivotal is the returning topic of dis-
tributed representations, which is argued to connect those
three modeling approaches.
Organization of this article
In this article, insights from representational, connectionist,
and DST approaches are combined to sustain the proposal
that the cognitive architecture of perceptual organization is
constituted by gnosons, that is, by transient neural sub-
networks exhibiting synchronization as a manifestation of
transparallel processing of similar features. To elaborate
these issues, I hardly discuss details of specific models
within the three above-mentioned modeling approaches to
cognition. Rather, I aim to assess differences and parallels
between the modeling tools they provide to understand the
role of neuronal synchronization in perceptual organiza-
tion. To this end, the organization of this article is as
follows.
• In section ‘‘The visual hierarchy’’, I review neurosci-
entific evidence on the intertwined but functionally
distinguishable subprocesses that are believed to con-
stitute the perceptual organization process in the visual
hierarchy in the brain—followed by a discussion of the
dynamics and earlier-proposed meanings of neuronal
synchronization.
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• In section ‘‘A representationally inspired algorithmic
account’’, I discuss my algorithmic model of the
perceptual organization process—introduced by an
overview of theoretical ideas and developments within
the representational approach that underlies this algo-
rithmic model.
• In section ‘‘Towards a pluralist account’’, to substan-
tiate my pluralist approach, I discuss metatheoretical
issues such as metaphors of cognition, levels of
description, and forms of processing—now and again
expanding on traditional views in a way that, in my
view, is appropriate to relate representational, connec-
tionist, and DST approaches to each other.
• In section ‘‘Cognitive architecture’’, I discuss implications
regarding cognitive architecture—grounding gnosons
as constituents of flexible self-organizing cognitive
architecture.
Before I proceed, a few general remarks seem in order.
In this article, I present an idea about the meaning and role
of neuronal synchronization. Whether neuronal synchro-
nization indeed exhibits the specific behaviors I suggest is
a question I gladly leave to future research by expert
experimentators. My objective as a theorist is to provide
arguments for a hopefully innovative idea that is not in
conflict with existing evidence—I think that such ideas are
needed to round the empirical cycle.
Furthermore, this is a multidisciplinary article, and
probably the biggest challenge for such articles is the usage
of different terminologies by different domains. Therefore,
now and again, I state things repeatedly but in different
terminologies, which may look redundant but which is
needed to assess whether statements from different
domains really express different things or merely look
different because they are stated in different ‘‘languages’’.
In other words, without denying that different domains
model things in different ways (I in fact cherish differ-
ences, because that is what complementarity is about), I
want to stress that different languages can also express the
same things.
Finally, a multidisciplinary article unavoidably contains
domain-specific parts which reflect textbook material to
some readers—they may skip such parts—but which are
yet necessary to serve other readers. Some readers may also
feel that some parts of this article still lack some pertinent
domain-specific details and related literature references. I
hope, however, that readers agree that such features are
inherent to attempts to find common ground for different
approaches to the same problem.
The visual hierarchy
This section sets the stage for my algorithmic model. First,
with a representationalist eye, I review neuroscientific
evidence on the intertwined but functionally distinguish-
able subprocesses that are believed to take place in the
visual hierarchy in the brain. Then, I discuss the phenom-
enon of neuronal synchronization, DST studies on its
dynamics, and neuroscientific ideas about its role in per-
ceptual organization.
To begin with standard textbook material, the top end of
the visual hierarchy seems to involve a smooth transition
into higher cognitive structures, while the bottom end can
be said to be in the primary visual area V1 in the occipital
lobe, which receives its main input from the lateral
geniculate nucleus (LGN) (see Fig. 2a). In the LGN, a
distinction can be made between retinal input entering the
parvocellular pathway and retinal input entering the mag-
nocellular pathway. Via V1 and higher visual areas, these
pathways bifurcate into a ventral and a dorsal stream which
seem to be dedicated to object perception and spatial per-
ception, respectively (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982; see
Fig. 2b).
The neural network in the visual hierarchy is organized
with 10–14 distinguishable hierarchical levels (with
Retina
LGN
OC
Visual
cortex
(a)
Object perception
Spatial perception(b)
Fig. 2 Visual pathways. a Retinal signals go, via the optic chiasm
(OC) and the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN), to the visual cortex;
the OC arranges that the left-hand visual fields of both eyes are
projected onto the right-hand cortex, and vice versa; in the LGN,
retinal signals enter parvocellular and magnocellular paths, which
perform a spatial frequency analysis. b In the visual cortex, the
signals bifurcate into ventral and dorsal streams which are dedicated
to object perception and spatial perception, respectively
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multiple distinguishable areas within each level), contains
many short-range and long-range connections (both within
and between levels), and it can be said to perform dis-
tributed hierarchical processing (Felleman and van Essen
1991). Furthermore, as depicted in Fig. 3, the intertwined
but functionally distinguishable subprocesses of feature
encoding, feature binding, and feature selection seem to be
mediated by feedforward (or ascending), horizontal (or
lateral), and recurrent (or feedback, or reentrant, or
descending) connections, respectively (see, e.g., Lamme
et al. 1998; Lamme and Roelfsema 2000). The horizontal
connections, in particular, have been associated with neu-
ronal synchronization, but for a complete picture, I first
discuss the others by conveying impressions I get from the
available evidence.
Feedforward feature encoding
Feedforward connections seem responsible for a fast bot-
tom-up processing of incoming stimuli. This so-called
feedforward sweep takes about 100 ms to reach the top end
of the visual hierarchy, and it is thought to yield an initial,
autonomous, tuning to features to which the visual system
is sensitive (which does not exclude top-down influences;
see both this and the next subsections). It is generally
thought that, during this feedforward sweep, more complex
things are coded in higher visual areas. Traditional ideas
about this increase in complexity lean upon the concept of
the classical receptive field (cRF). The cRF corresponds to
the region of the retina to which a neuron is connected by
way of feedforward connections (Hubel and Wiesel 1968).
This region is larger in higher visual areas, which suggests
that the difference between simple and complex things
corresponds merely to the spatial difference between small
(or local) and large (or global) features.
However, by way of horizontal and recurrent connec-
tions, neurons also receive input from neurons at the same
and higher levels in the visual hierarchy. This suggests that
a neuron is responsive to local features outside its cRF and
to global features extending beyond its cRF (Gilbert 1992;
Lamme et al. 1998; Salin and Bullier 1995). This suggests
that the feedforward sweep is part of a more intricate
process than just tuning and that, during this process,
higher visual areas accommodate features which, percep-
tually, turn out to be more categorical (cf. Ahissar and
Hochstein 2004; Hochstein and Ahissar 2002). I use the
term categorical to refer to dominant or salient features
which give the gist of a scene—for instance, because they
reflect statistical regularities in the environment (cf. Howe
and Purves 2004, 2005) or because they reflect geometrical
regularities in terms of correlations between elements in a
stimulus (cf. Kimchi and Palmer 1982; Leeuwenberg and
van der Helm 1991; Leeuwenberg et al. 1994).
A more categorical feature may correspond to a larger
feature, but not necessarily so. For instance, in visual
search studies, a target usually is a local feature (e.g., one
red item among many blue items; Treisman and Gelade
1980). The search for such a target is easier as the dis-
tractors are more similar to each other and more different
from the target (Donderi 2006; Duncan and Humphreys
1989; Wolfe 2007). Hence, a target may pop-out but only if
allowed by the distractors. This means that, for a target to
become a pop-out, the distractors have to be processed
first—this may well involve lateral inhibition among sim-
ilar things so that the target rises above the distractors, but
in any case, it seems plausible that the similarity of the
distractors is processed first in lower visual areas and that
the pop-out nature of the target ends up in higher visual
areas.
Recurrent feature selection
Recurrent connections seem responsible for a top-down
selection and integration of different features into percepts.
Somewhat related to the question of whether this subpro-
cess relies on environmental regularities or on stimulus
regularities (see above), a question is whether or not this
subprocess involves top-down processing starting from
beyond the visual hierarchy. For instance, Hochstein and
Ahissar (2002) proposed that, via recurrent connections
from beyond the visual hierarchy, attention can be
deployed in a top-down fashion to any level in the visual
hierarchy (see also Wolfe 2007). This would imply that it
first captures things coded in higher visual areas and that, if
required by task and allowed by time, it may descend along
recurrent connections to capture things coded in lower
Feature encoding
Feature binding
Feature binding
Feature selection
Fig. 3 The three intertwined subprocesses that are believed to take
place in the visual hierarchy in the brain. Feedforward connections
seem responsible for an initial feature encoding; horizontal connec-
tions seem responsible for binding similar features within visual
areas; and recurrent connections seem responsible for selecting and
integrating different features into percepts
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areas. Given the above picture of the feedforward sweep,
this suggests that a pop-out is not a pop-out because it is
(nonconsciously) processed first during the bottom-up
feedforward sweep, but because its pop-out nature ends up
in higher visual areas so that it is among the first things
(consciously) encountered by top-down attentional
processes.
This picture of the role of recurrent connections in the
deployment of attention agrees with Lamme et al. (1998)
and Lamme and Roelfsema (2000), who also noted that it
may explain the effect of backward masking. A structured
stimulus and a subsequent random mask trigger successive
feedforward sweeps, and the second sweep (by the mask)
then may perturb the trace of the first sweep (by the
stimulus) in lower visual areas, so that attention can cap-
ture only the more categorical stimulus features coded in
higher visual areas. This agrees with the above idea that, in
general, less-structured parts (as in a random mask) are
coded in lower areas than more-structured organizations
into wholes (as in a structured stimulus). It also explains
Leeuwenberg et al. (1985) finding that, if a part and a
whole are presented briefly and with small stimulus onset
asynchrony (SOA), then not only their presentation order
but also their structural relationship determines how well
the part is identified afterward. It further explains van der
Vloed et al. (2007) similar finding which, by way of
example, I discuss next in more detail.
Van der Vloed et al. (2007) considered stimuli com-
posed of one symmetrical (S) or random (R) part sur-
rounding another symmetrical or random part (see Fig. 4).
The parts were presented for 200 ms each, either simulta-
neously (SOA = 0) or not (SOA = 20–100 ms), and the
task was to identify a given stimulus as being partly
symmetrical (for SOA [ 0, presented in the orders SR
or RS) versus either completely random or completely
symmetrical (for SOA [ 0, referred to by RR and SS,
respectively). For SOA = 0, the partly symmetrical stimuli
behaved like normal noisy symmetries, with the well-
known quantitative effect that, compared to symmetry in
the surround, symmetry in the center yields better dis-
crimination from completely random stimuli and worse
discrimination from completely symmetrical stimuli (Bar-
low and Reeves 1979). For SOA[0, however, there was a
qualitative effect of order, no matter whether symmetry
was in the surround or in the center: compared to SOA = 0,
SR showed no difference (just as RR and SS), but RS
yielded better discrimination from RR and worse discrim-
ination from SS.
This order effect again agrees with the idea that, in
general, less-structured (e.g., random) information is coded
in lower areas than more-structured (e.g., symmetry)
information. That is, in SR, the code of the symmetry first
settles relatively high and the code of the later-presented
random information remains relatively low—just as when
the parts were presented simultaneously. In RS, however,
the symmetry—on its way to be coded relatively high—
passes through the lower areas where the code of the pre-
ceding random information already resides; thereby, it
perturbs (or masks) the encoded random information,
resulting in a percept that reflects less randomness than
there really is.
Notice that the foregoing suggests that structural rela-
tionships within and between stimuli presented subse-
quently with small SOA form a factor to be reckoned with
(e.g., in experiments involving priming or masking; see
also Hermens and Herzog 2007). That is, it asserts that
structural factors are at least as relevant as spatio-temporal
factors (probably also in, e.g., apparent motion; see Moore
et al. 2007).
Also notice, however, that the examples above involve
experimental paradigms in which participants respond
consciously, that is, they respond on the basis of attentional
scrutiny of already-encoded percepts. The question there-
fore still is whether the formation of these percepts is
controlled by endogenous, attention-driven, recurrent pro-
cessing starting from beyond the visual hierarchy (see, e.g.,
Lamme et al. 1998; Lamme and Roelfsema 2000) or by
exogenous, stimulus-driven, recurrent processing within
the visual hierarchy (see, e.g., Gray 1999; Moore et al.
2007; Pylyshyn 1999). The latter reflects my modeling
stance in this article, but as I clarify next, it leaves room for
the former (see also, e.g., van Leeuwen et al. 2011).
The combination of feedforward and recurrent process-
ing in the visual hierarchy might be analogous to the cas-
cade formed by a fountain under increasing water pressure.
That is, as the feedforward sweep progresses along
ascending connections, each passed level in the visual
hierarchy forms the starting point of integrative recurrent
Center (200 ms)
Surround (200 ms)
SOA
Fig. 4 Time course of a trial in van der Vloed et al. (2007). First, one
part of the stimulus is presented (here, a symmetrical center). This
part remains visible for 200 ms in total, but after an SOA of
0–100 ms, it is complemented with the remaining part (here, a
random surround). After 200 ms, the first part disappears and the
second part still remains visible for as long as the SOA was so that it
is also visible for 200 ms in total
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processing along descending connections. This yields a
gradual buildup from partial percepts at lower levels in the
hierarchy to complete percepts near its top end. This
implies, on the one hand, that top-down attentional pro-
cesses may intrude before a percept has completed, but on
the other hand, that the perceptual organization process has
already done much of its integrative work by then. To
paraphrase Neisser (1967), before you can pick an apple
from a tree, you first have to perceptually organize the
scene to at least some degree.
Horizontal feature binding
In between the two just-discussed intertwined subprocesses,
horizontal connections seem responsible for binding similar
features. This seems to yield feature constellations from
which, as mentioned above, recurrent processing seems to
select and integrate different features into percepts. For
instance, as Lamme et al. (1998) noted, a well-established
property of horizontal fibers is that they interconnect cells
with similar orientation preferences and that these connec-
tions are strongest when cRFs are also co-axially aligned
(see, e.g., Bosking et al. 1997; Gilbert 1993, 1996; Malach
et al. 1993; Schmidt et al. 1997).
Horizontal binding is a relatively underexposed topic,
but to be clear, it seems to concern binding of similar
features, with, at least in my model, also a very positive
efficiency effect on the subsequent selection and integra-
tion of different features. Notice that, in my model, I focus
on second-order features such as symmetry and repetition.
In section ‘‘Introduction’’, I already mentioned that I do not
think this conflicts with neuroscientific evidence (cf. Tyler
et al. 2005) and that pre-attentive detection of such regu-
larities is believed to be an integral part of the perceptual
organization process (Simon 1972; Tyler 1996; van der
Helm and Leeuwenberg 1996; Wagemans 1997). In fact,
horizontal binding may well be the neuronal counterpart of
the regularity extraction operations which, in representa-
tional theory, are proposed to lead to structured mental
representations.
The subprocess of horizontal feature binding seems to
start in V1 and seems to be followed by feature recoding in
higher visual areas (Pollen 1999; see also Eckhorn 1999;
Gray 1999; Tyler et al. 2005). Furthermore, I can only
imagine that it is intertwined with the already intertwined
subprocesses of feedforward feature encoding and recur-
rent feature selection. In any case, such intertwining is key
in my model (see section ‘‘A representationally inspired
algorithmic account’’). Finally, the horizontal feature
binding seems to be mediated by transient neural assem-
blies which also have been implicated in the phenomenon
of neuronal synchronization (see, e.g., Eckhorn 1999;
Eckhorn et al. 1988; Engel et al. 1990; Gilbert 1992; Gray
et al. 1989, 1990; Gray and Singer 1989). Because my
investigation into cognitive architecture revolves around a
computational account of this phenomenon, I next discuss
it in more detail.
Neuronal synchronization
In representational approaches, a mental representation of a
scene (or a percept, or a Gestalt) is said to carry informa-
tion about the perceptual structure of the scene—that is,
about properties (such as shape, parts, and spatial
arrangement) of the perceived objects. DST proponents
tend to reject the existence of representations, but the term
representation can also be said to refer to a relatively stable
cognitive state which arises during the dynamic neural
process (cf. Kelso 1995). Such a state constitutes the
brain’s response to a scene, and it can therefore be said to
represent what representationalists call the information
about the perceptual structure of the scene (cf. Bem and
Looren de Jong 2006).
In any case, for a specific scene, this response (or this
information) must also be given (or represented), probably
isomorphically, by a specific neural activation pattern
(Ko¨hler 1920; Lehar 1999, 2003; Pavloski 2011). That is, it
is no surprise that, as shown in brain-imaging studies,
different stimuli evoke different neural responses. The
question, however, is how to explain these differences.
Therefore, cracking the neural code is a central issue in
neuroscience. Traditionally, the spike rate of neurons (i.e.,
the firing rate, or the rate of action potentials) is seen as an
important component of the neural code. For instance, the
spike rate of neurons may increase as the intensity of a
stimulus increases (Adrian and Zotterman 1926). Nowa-
days, however, as I discuss next, correlations which rely on
the precise timing of spikes are seen as being probably
more important.
It has been argued that, in general, correlations between
spike trains can only reduce, and never increase, the total
amount of information in spike trains (Johnson 1980a, b).
This, however, may hold if one adopts Shannon’s (1948)
classical probabilistic quantification of information, but not
if one adopts modern descriptive quantifications of infor-
mation (see Li and Vita´nyi 1997; van der Helm 2000). For
instance, the equality of two equal messages (e.g., spike
trains) is not coded in these messages themselves, so that
this equality forms a message in itself. This message may
be conveyed by a code which captures the correlation
between the two equal messages so that, this way, corre-
lations increase the total amount of conveyable information
(Nirenberg and Latham 2003).
Particularly interesting are temporal correlations in the
form of neuronal synchronization. As said, neuronal syn-
chronization is the phenomenon that neurons, in transient
Cogn Process (2012) 13:13–40 19
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assemblies, temporarily synchronize their activity (the
aggregate of their cRFs then forms what Eckhorn 1999
called an association field). It has been related to cortical
integration and, more generally, to cognitive processing
(Milner 1974; von der Malsburg 1981). It is true that, as
Shadlen and Movshon (1999) noted, one speaks of syn-
chronization when neurons fire within a fairly arbitrarily
chosen small time window, that is, the spikes do not have
to be completely coincident in time. Empirically, however,
it is a well-established phenomenon that has been associ-
ated with a broad range of cognitive processes (for reviews,
see, e.g., Finkel et al. 1998; Gray 1999).
For instance, oscillatory synchronization in the theta,
alpha, and beta bands (4–30 Hz) seems involved in inter-
actions between relatively distant brain structures, while
oscillatory synchronization in the gamma band (30–70 Hz)
seems involved in relatively local computations (see, e.g.,
Kopell et al. 2000; von Stein and Sarnthein 2000). More
specifically, theta, alpha, and beta synchronization have
been found to be correlated with, for instance, top-down
processes dealing with aspects of memory, expectancy, and
task (see, e.g., Kahana 2006; van der Togt et al. 2006; von
Stein et al. 2000). Furthermore, gamma synchronization
has been found to be correlated particularly with visual
processes—such as those dealing with change detection,
interocular rivalry, feature binding, Gestalt formation, and
form discrimination (see, e.g., Bo¨rgers et al. 2005; Fries
et al. 1997; Keil et al. 1999; Lu et al. 2006; Singer and
Gray 1995; Womelsdorf et al. 2006).
In this article, I have this ‘‘visual’’ gamma synchroni-
zation in mind. Next, I first briefly review DST research
into the dynamics of synchronization, and then I discuss
existing neuroscientific ideas about its function and
meaning.
The dynamics of synchronization
Synchronization is a long-standing topic in DST (see, e.g.,
Pikovsky et al. 2001; Wu 2007). It probably started with
Huygens (1673/1986) who observed that two pendulum
clocks, coupled by suspending them from the same wooden
beam, tend to synchronize their motion. From a DST point
of view, this topic is intriguing because, in general, DST
describes system behavior that, at first glance, seems cha-
otic and unpredictable—such systems seem to defy an
orderly thing like synchronization (Pecora and Carroll
1990). To describe seemingly chaotic system behavior,
DST uses the powerful mathematical tools called nonlinear
partial differential equations (NPDEs) which, traditionally,
find application mainly in physics (e.g., to make weather
forecasts).
A differential equation typically describes the develop-
ment of a system over time (where the ‘‘system’’ may be
anything one chooses it to be). It does not specify system
states as such but, instead, it specifies the difference
between any one state and the next (with arbitrarily small
time steps). This implies that, to determine actual system
states, also a starting state must be given. So-called linear
differential equations can usually be solved analytically
(yielding one formula which, for every starting state,
specifies subsequent system states) and imply that a change
in the starting state yields a proportional change in sub-
sequent states. This does not hold for NPDEs, however. For
different starting states, an NPDE may have different
solutions, and a small change in the starting state may yield
a dramatic change in subsequent states. Therefore, actual
system states can usually only be determined numerically,
that is, by way of subsequent applications of the NPDE.
To add some flavor, the state space refers to the set of all
states, over all starting states, a system may arrive at
according to an NPDE. A trajectory then is the sequence of
states the system passes from a specific starting state, and
an attractor is a state for which the system can be said to
have a preference, that is, a relatively stable state reached
for relatively many nearby starting states. Applied to per-
ceptual organization, attractors can be said to correspond to
cognitive states, or percepts (Eliasmith 2001)—they should
not be too stable, though, because the system must be able
to switch from one percept to another (Spivey 2007; van
Leeuwen 2007). Furthermore, a strong point of DST is that
potential behavior of a system under various imaginable
settings can be investigated by varying parameters in the
starting state or in the NPDE. This method is also used in
DST studies on synchronization in networks, mostly in the
context of vision research.
For instance, van Leeuwen et al. (1997) performed
simulations with a sparsely connected network of nonlinear
maps. They found that the coupling strength between the
maps, in proportion to the rate of chaotic divergence,
determines whether rapid transitions occur between
unsynchronized and synchronized states of varying
assemblies of maps (see also Buzsa´ki and Draguhn 2004).
Furthermore, for networks of locally coupled integrate-
and-fire oscillators, Campbell et al. (1999) investigated
(de)synchronization parameters and found that the time to
synchronize seems proportional to the logarithm of the
network size, or in other words, that synchronization
propagates exponentially. Moreover, gamma and beta
rhythms seem to have different synchronization properties
(Kopell et al. 2000), and for gamma rhythms, the time to
synchronize seems to fit the gamma cycle (Harris et al.
2003).
These are in fact just a few of the many studies into the
dynamics of synchronization in networks (see also, e.g.,
Izhikevich 2006; Li 1998; Roelfsema et al. 1996; Sporns
et al. 1991; Yen and Finkel 1998; Yen et al. 1999). This
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DST research does not affect the information-processing
ideas in the model I discuss in section ‘‘A representation-
ally inspired algorithmic account’’, but it does provide
necessary complementary insights into a question left open
by this model. That is, in Marr’s (1982/2010) terms, this
DST research is not about the computational goal or
algorithmic method of the information process I attribute to
gnosons (i.e., the transient assemblies of synchronized
neurons), but it is about how the implementational means
might allow gnosons to go in and out of existence.
Proposed meanings of synchronization
As said, neuronal synchronization seems to occur most
notably in neural assemblies formed by horizontal con-
nections, and these assemblies are also thought to mediate
the binding of similar features. A binding function, but then
referring to integration of different features, is reflected in
the temporal correlation hypothesis (Milner 1974; von der
Malsburg 1981; for a review, see Gray 1999). This
hypothesis holds that synchronization binds those neurons
that, together, represent one perceptual entity, say, an
object or a Gestalt (see also Eckhorn et al. 2001; but see
also Thiele and Stoner 2003). I think that synchronization
is indeed related to perceptual organization, but I do not
think it is a binding force, because that would beg the
question of which neurons are to be bound (Shadlen and
Movshon 1999). In other words, synchronization may
signal what is going on, namely, perceptual organization,
but it does not account for how perceptual organizations
are computed.
Other ideas about neuronal synchronization are, for
instance, that it underlies consciousness (Crick and Koch
1990; later, Crick and Koch 2003, rejected this idea),
or that it is under the control of selective attention
(Womelsdorf and Fries 2007), or that it is a marker that a
steady state has been achieved (Pollen 1999), or that its
strength is an index of the salience of features (Finkel
et al., 1998; Salinas and Sejnowski 2001). In line with the
latter idea, Fries (2005) proposed that more strongly syn-
chronized assemblies in a visual area are locked on more
easily by higher visual areas.
These ideas all sound plausible and may all contain
some truth: as Sejnowski and Paulsen (2006) argued,
neuronal synchronization may reflect a flexible and effi-
cient mechanism subserving the representation of infor-
mation, the regulation of the flow of information, and the
storage and retrieval of information (see also Tallon-Bau-
dry 2009). All those ideas, however, are about cognitive
factors associated with synchronization rather than about
the nature of the underlying cognitive process itself.
Therefore, instead of saying that synchronization mediates
cognitive processes, I prefer to say that it is a manifestation
of cognitive processing—just as the bubbles in boiling
water are a manifestation of the boiling process (see also
Bojak and Liley 2007; Shadlen and Movshon 1999).
This does not make synchronization less interesting—on
the contrary, it raises the question of what form of pro-
cessing it might be a manifestation. The goal of this pro-
cess seems to be feature binding, but its method does not
seem to be a simple form of parallel processing. In section
‘‘Forms of processing’’, I go into more detail on forms of
processing, but basically, parallel processing is performed
by different agents who simultaneously do different things.
When these agents simultaneously do the same thing,
however, they seem to enter another processing mode—
think of flash mobs or of groups of singers going from
cacophony to harmony. Indeed, considering the complexity
of perceptual organization, with its high combinatorial
capacity and high speed, it must be a special form of
processing that manifests itself by synchronization. In the
next section, I discuss my algorithmic model of perceptual
organization, incorporating not only the three intertwined
subprocesses discussed above but also this special form of
processing, called transparallel processing, whose neural
signature is proposed to be neuronal synchronization.
A representationally inspired algorithmic account
In this section, I discuss my algorithmic model of per-
ceptual organization. To give a proper impression of this
model, it is expedient to begin by reviewing Leeuwen-
berg’s (1969, 1971) structural information theory (SIT),
which is its underlying representational approach. SIT’s
information-theoretic approach differs fundamentally from
Shannon’s (1948) classical approach in that it starts from a
totally different idea about how information is to be mea-
sured (for more details, see van der Helm 2000; see also
Luce 2003). In the 1980s, SIT received considerable crit-
icism, but as this section may be proof of, it has fully
recovered from that criticism, and nowadays, it is probably
the most elaborated representational approach to perceptual
organization (Palmer 1999).
Structural information theory
For a proper appreciation of SIT, it is crucial to distinguish
between the theory and the representational coding model
implemented in my algorithmic model. SIT’s theory, on the
one hand, is a coherent set of ideas about visual form
perception (see this section ‘‘Structural information the-
ory’’)—its central idea being that the visual system selects
the most simple interpretation of a given stimulus. SIT’s
coding model and my implementation thereof, on the other
hand, constitute a formal model that implements SIT’s
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theoretical ideas, but then applied to patterned sequences of
symbols (see section ‘‘A transparallel processing model’’).
This distinction is crucial because, as I address first, a
persistent misunderstanding about SIT seems to be that it is
thought to assume that the visual system converts visual
stimuli into symbol strings
As I discuss more extensively in section ‘‘Metaphors of
cognition’’, any formal model uses and manipulates sym-
bols. This holds for SIT’s model, just as it holds for DST
and connectionist models. To design a formal model, the
modeler decides what the symbols stand for, and more
importantly, which principles are implemented. In DST
models, these principles are reflected by NPDEs; in con-
nectionist models, they are reflected by activation spread-
ing through networks; and in SIT’s model, they are
reflected by regularity extracting operations. Notice that, in
each case, the principles are implemented to capture rela-
tionships between the things the symbols stand for, and that
in this respect, SIT’s model is no exception.
It is true that, in the SIT literature, relatively much
attention has been paid to how symbol strings might rep-
resent interpretations of visual stimuli, but this merely
serves to illustrate how, in the empirical practice, the for-
mal principles might be applied to visual stimuli in order to
get testable quantitative predictions. That is, to be clear,
SIT does not assume that the visual system converts visual
stimuli into symbol strings. Furthermore, like any theory,
SIT has limitations and open ends. For instance, it does not
provide an algorithm that can take visual stimuli as input;
hence, in the empirical practice, it is up to experimentators
to choose and analyze relevant candidate interpretations in
a perceptually plausible way. This may involve both 2-D
and 3-D interpretations, and what matters in such analyses
is that SIT’s theory assumes that the visual system employs
the same information-processing principles as those which
SIT’s model considers for strings.
Theoretical starting points
Representational approaches aim to gain insight into cog-
nitive processes, and they do so by modeling systematici-
ties in the output as a function of the input (i.e., what
characterizes the nature of the output?). In the past, rep-
resentational models may not have paid much attention to
process mechanisms, but the idea of course was and still is
that unraveling input-output systematicities is a first and
necessary step towards proposing process mechanisms—
after all, one has to know the goal before proposing a
method to reach that goal. To this end, they focus on the
informational content of mental representations which, as
indicated before, can be taken to be relatively stable cog-
nitive states arising during a dynamic neural process.
Unlike DST and connectionist approaches, representational
approaches assume this process involves regularity
extraction to get structured representations.
SIT takes the output to be a perceptual organization of
an incoming visual stimulus. Detection of regularities such
as symmetry and repetition subserves object perception and
is believed to be an integral part of this perceptual orga-
nization process (Simon 1972; Tyler 1996; Wagemans
1997). Accordingly, SIT assumes that such regularities are
extracted to construct candidate interpretations for a given
stimulus, that is, candidate hierarchical organizations of the
stimulus in terms of wholes and parts. It assumes further
that the interpretation with the most simple descriptive
code (i.e., the code that captures a maximum of regularity)
is selected as the preferred interpretation.
SIT’s selection criterion, which is called the simplicity
principle, is a descendant of Hochberg and McAlister’s
(1953) minimum principle. Both are modern information-
theoretical translations of the law of Pra¨gnanz which
Koffka (1935) proposed as a general principle in cognition
(cf. Attneave 1954). In vision, this law has been proposed
to underlie the various Gestalt laws of perceptual grouping
(e.g., the laws of proximity, symmetry, similarity, and
closure; Wertheimer 1923). Inspired by the minimum
principle in physics, which refers to the tendency of
physical systems to settle into relatively stable energy
states, it states more specifically: of several geometrically
possible organizations that one will actually occur which
possesses the best, the most stable shape (Koffka 1935).
Hence, SIT models such a stable state as corresponding
to a most simple descriptive code. As I discuss later on,
connectionism models it as corresponding to a steady
pattern of activation in a network, which, in DST terms,
corresponds to an attractor in the network’s state space.
Indeed, nowadays, all three approaches to cognition tend to
find their roots in the Gestaltist motto that the whole is
something else than the sum of its parts (cf. Sundqvist
2003; van der Helm 2006). Hence, they all aim to model
aspects of the same thing—albeit in different terms and
with noteworthy modeling differences.
For instance, to obtain good data fits, DST and con-
nectionist modeling involves tuning of model parameters,
whereas SIT’s approach is basically parameter-free (see
section ‘‘A transparallel processing model’’). Furthermore,
unlike DST, both connectionism and SIT assume a com-
petition between simultaneously present candidate out-
puts—but with a crucial difference. In connectionist
models, a pre-defined network represents an output space
for all possible inputs, and the process of activation
spreading merely serves to select, for a given input, an
output from this total output space. This contrasts with my
SIT model which (a) first constructs an output space for
only the input at hand and (b) then selects an output from
this limited, input-dependent, output space. The selection
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in (b) is performed in a way that, computationally, is
comparable to connectionist activation spreading (see
section ‘‘Distributed processing’’). The construction in
(a), however, is not standard in connectionist modeling
and is probably the most distinguishing aspect of my
model (see also sections ‘‘A transparallel processing
model’’, ‘‘Connectionist modeling’’, and ‘‘Distributed
representations’’).
Theoretical developments
Since the 1960s, and in interaction with empirical research,
SIT developed from a classical coding model of pattern
classification (Leeuwenberg 1969, 1971; cf. Simon 1972)
into a competitive theory of perceptual organization (Pal-
mer 1999). To further specify the theoretical context of my
algorithmic model, I next give a brief overview of these
developments (see the included literature references for
further details).
Nowadays, SIT includes a theoretically sound and
empirically successful quantification of pattern complexity
(van der Helm 1994; van der Helm et al. 1992), and an
empirically successful quantitative model of amodal com-
pletion (van Lier 1999; van Lier et al. 1994). To predict
preferred interpretations, this model applies a distinction
and interaction between (viewpoint-independent) structural
properties of candidate distal objects and (viewpoint-
dependent) spatial relationships between these objects—
reflecting the distinction and interaction between object
perception and spatial perception, or between the ventral
and dorsal streams in the brain (see Fig. 2b). Using findings
from algorithmic information theory (see Li and Vita´nyi
1997), a Bayesian translation of this model led to the
assessment that the simplicity principle is a general-pur-
pose principle in that it promises to be fairly veridical in
many different environments. This contrasts, in my view
favorably, with the likelihood principle (von Helmholtz
1909/1962) which is a special-purpose principle in that it,
by definition, is highly veridical in only one environment
(for more details, see van der Helm 2000, 2002, 2007,
2011).
In addition, SIT nowadays includes an empirically
successful quantitative model of symmetry perception (van
der Helm and Leeuwenberg 1996, 1999, 2004). This model
does not start from the traditionally considered transfor-
mational formalization of regularity (Garner 1974; Palmer
1983) which suits object recognition, but from a formal-
ization that suits object perception (van der Helm and
Leeuwenberg 1991). The latter defines visually relevant
regularities as being holographic and hierarchically trans-
parent. To give a gist, a stimulus regularity is holographic
if all its substructures reflect the same kind of regularity;
this allows its code to be built step-wise by going from
small to large substructures (think of an organism pre-
serving its shape symmetry while growing). Furthermore, a
stimulus regularity is hierarchically transparent if regular-
ities nested in its code are stimulus regularities too (i.e., are
also accessible separately from this code); this ensures that
codes specify stimulus organizations with properly nested
wholes and parts.
The properties of holography and hierarchical trans-
parency pinpoint the unique formal status of the regulari-
ties called repetition, symmetry, and alternation (the latter
covers, e.g., Glass patterns; Glass 1969). These regularities
are generally considered to be visual regularities (i.e.,
regularities to which the visual system is sensitive), and in
SIT, they are proposed to be extracted to construct candi-
date organizations of a given stimulus. As I discuss next,
these regularities also have remarkable computational
properties.
A transparallel processing model
SIT’s formal model of perceptual organization takes
symbol strings as input. As said, this does not mean that
SIT assumes that the visual system converts visual
stimuli into strings—instead, the idea is that the visual
system employs the same information-processing prin-
ciples as those which SIT’s model considers for strings.
The main principle is the simplicity principle, which
implies that all candidate organizations of an input are
considered and that the one with the most simple
descriptive code is selected as the preferred organiza-
tion. This principle is theoretically and empirically
sound (see previous subsection), but it also suggests a
daunting tractability problem (cf. Hatfield and Epstein
1985). Next, for strings, I first explicate this problem,
and then I discuss my solution.
Defining the problem
To construct all candidate hierarchical organizations of a
string, SIT’s formal model encodes the string by means of
coding rules which extract the hierarchically transparent
holographic regularities called repetition (or iteration I),
symmetry (S), and alternation (A). These coding rules can
be applied to any substring of the input string, and a code
of the entire input string consists of a string of symbols and
coded substrings, such that decoding the code returns the
input string. In formal terms, SIT’s coding language is
defined by:
Definition 1 A code X of a string X is a string t1t2. . .tm of
code terms ti such that X ¼ Dðt1Þ. . .DðtmÞ, where the
decoding function D : t ! DðtÞ takes one of the following
forms:
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I-form: n  ðyÞ ! yyy. . .y (n times
y;
n C 2)
S-form: S½ðx1Þðx2Þ. . .ðxnÞ; ðpÞ ! x1x2. . .xn p xn. . .x2x1 (n C 1)
A-form: hðyÞi=hðx1Þðx2Þ. . .ðxnÞi ! yx1 yx2 . . . yxn (n C 2)
A-form: hðx1Þðx2Þ. . .ðxnÞi=hðyÞi ! x1y x2y . . . xny (n C 2)
Otherwise: D(t) = t
for strings y, p, and xi (i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n). The code parts
ðyÞ; ðpÞ, and ðxiÞ are chunks; the chunk ðyÞ in an I-form or
an A-form is a repeat; the chunk ðpÞ in an S-form is a pivot
which, as a limit case, may be empty; the chunk string
ðx1Þðx2Þ. . .ðxnÞ in an S-form is an S-argument consisting of
S-chunks ðxiÞ, and in an A-form, it is an A-argument
consisting of A-chunks ðxiÞ.
Hence, a code may involve not only recursive encodings
of strings inside chunks, that is, from (y) into ðyÞ, but also
hierarchically recursive encodings of S- or A-arguments
ðx1Þðx2Þ. . .ðxnÞ into ðx1Þðx2Þ. . .ðxnÞ. For instance, below, a
string is encoded in two ways, and for each code, the
resulting hierarchical organization of the string is given:
String: X = abacdacdababacdacdab
Code 1: X ¼ a b 2  ðacdÞ S½ðaÞðbÞ; ðaÞ 2  ðcdaÞ b
Organization: a b (acd)(acd) (a)(b)(a)(b)(a) (cda)(cda) b
Code 2: X ¼ 2  ðhðaÞi=hS½ððbÞÞððcdÞÞiÞ
Organization: ( ((a)(b)) ((a)(cd)) ((a)(cd)) ((a)(b)) )
( ((a)(b)) ((a)(cd)) ((a)(cd)) ((a)(b)) )
Code 1 does not involve recursive encodings, but Code
2 does: it is an I-form with a repeat that has been encoded
into an A-form with an A-argument that, in turn, has been
encoded into an S-form. These examples also illustrate the
problem that a string generally has many codes—which all
have to be considered to select a most simple one.
Notice that the exact definition of SIT’s complexity
metric is not relevant in this article (the number of
remaining symbols in a code can be taken as a good
approximation) and that the problem lies in the huge
number of candidate codes. This is analogous to the
problem the visual system faces (see section ‘‘Introduc-
tion’’). In fact, to expand this analogy, the code 2(ab) of
string abab, for instance, reflects a higher-level organiza-
tion 2(y) in which y refers to lower-level parts ab. This is
analogous to how I imagine that wholes and parts are
represented at different levels in the visual hierarchy in the
brain (see section ‘‘The visual hierarchy’’).
One may infer from Def. 1 that I-forms do not pose a big
computational problem, but that a substring of length k can
be encoded into O(2k) S-forms and O(k2k) A-forms. [The
‘‘big O’’ notation O(g), with g some function, has a precise
mathematical definition, but it means essentially ‘‘in the
order of magnitude of g’’.] To pinpoint a most simple one,
also most simple codes of the arguments of these S- and
A-forms have to be determined, and so on—with O(log
N) recursion steps because, for a substring of length k, the
argument of a covering S- or A-form has maximally length
k/2. Hence, if each S- and A-argument were to be recoded
separately, then the entire process would require a super-
exponential O(2N log N) amount of work which, to both
computers and brains, could easily require more time than
is available in this universe (cf. van Rooij 2008).
To solve this problem, I implemented the transparallel
processing algorithm I presented earlier (see van der Helm
2004, also for its full formal and tractability details). Only
later, I realized that the three intertwined subprocesses of
feature encoding, feature binding, and feature selection—
which this algorithm implements—correspond to the three
subprocesses which, in neuroscience, are believed to take
place in the visual hierarchy in the brain (see Fig. 5). To
specify this correspondence, I next sketch how I modeled
the three subprocesses, with a special eye for feature
binding which is relevant to the synchronization issue (see
section ‘‘Towards a pluralist account’’) and, thereby, also
(a) (b)Feature selection
Feature binding
Feature binding
Feature encoding
All−pairs shortest path method
Hyperstrings
Hyperstrings
All−substrings identification
Fig. 5 a Copy of Fig. 3,
depicting the three intertwined
subprocesses that are believed
to take place in the visual
hierarchy in the brain. b The
three corresponding and also
intertwined methods
implemented in the transparallel
processing model of perceptual
organization
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to the cognitive architecture issue (see section ‘‘Cognitive
architecture’’).
Feature encoding
In the model, the subprocess of feature encoding involves
an exhaustive search for hierarchically transparent holo-
graphic regularities (i.e., repetitions, symmetries, and
alternations) in the input string, and hierarchically recur-
sively, in the arguments of S- and A-forms. This subpro-
cess corresponds to the feedforward sweep yielding an
initial tuning, from lower to higher visual areas, to regu-
larities to which the visual system is sensitive.
The search for regularities in the input string or in an S-
or A-argument starts with a so-called all-substrings iden-
tification. This preprocess assigns identical numerals to
identical substrings, so that the regularity search can
identify identical substrings by these numerals instead of
by, each time, a cumbersome symbol-by-symbol compar-
ison. A naive method to do this preprocess would require
O(N4) computing steps for a string of length N, but the
model uses an O(N2) method which, in computer science,
informally is called a smart method (I return to such
methods in section ‘‘Distributed processing’’).
Hence, this preprocess corresponds to an initial pick-up
of information by which identical stimulus parts as such are
encoded by identical neuronal responses. After this pre-
process, it is easy to find separate regularities, but because
of the hierarchically recursive nature of the search for
regularities, a naive algorithm for an exhaustive search
would require an unacceptable superexponential amount of
work and time (see previous subsection). As I discuss next,
a solution to this problem lies in feature binding by
hyperstrings.
Feature binding
In the model, feature binding is implemented by gathering
similar regularities in so-called hyperstrings—not as a goal
in itself, but to allow for transparallel recoding of these
regularities. To specify this crucial point, I begin with van
der Helm’s (2004) graph-theoretical definition of hyper-
strings (for details on graph theory, see Harary 1994).
Definition 2 A hyperstring is a simple semi-Hamiltonian
directed acyclic graph (V, E) with a labeling of the edges in
E such that, for all vertices i; j; p; q 2 V , either
p(i, j) = p(p, q) or p(i, j) \ p(p, q) = [, where a sub-
string set p(v1,v2) is the set of label strings represented by
the paths from vertex v1 to vertex v2; the subgraph formed
by the vertices and edges in these paths is a hypersubstring.
Hence, a hyperstring is a graph with, for N nodes, O(N2)
links between the nodes and O(2N) paths from the first node
to the last node (see Fig. 6 for an example). Each of the
links represents a string element, so that each of the paths
through the graph represents a string (in which the nodes
represent locations). In other words, a hyperstring on
N nodes is a distributed representation of O(2N) strings, that
is, it represents O(2N) strings in a distributed fashion
(notice that this characteristic is usually associated with
connectionist modeling). Presently most relevant is the
special property of hyperstrings that substring sets repre-
sented by hypersubstrings are either identical or disjoint—
never something in between. For instance, in Fig. 6, the
substrings sets p(1,4) and p(5,8) are identical, that is, they
both represent the substrings abc, ay, and xc. The relevance
hereof may be explicated, in two steps, by means of the
following examples.
The string ababfababgbabafbaba of length N = 19
can be encoded into O(2N) S-forms, for instance into
S[(a)(b)(a)(b)(f)(a)(b)(a)(b), (g)] and S[(aba)(b)(f)(a)
(bab), (g)]. In Fig. 7a, the arguments of all these S-forms
have been gathered in a distributed representation. For
instance, the arguments of the two S-forms above are
represented by the path along all vertices and by the path
along vertices 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 10, respectively. In
general, after the above-mentioned O(N2) all-substrings
identification, the arguments of all S- and A-forms in a
string can be gathered in O(N) distributed representa-
tions like the one in Fig. 7a. Such a distributed repre-
sentation can be constructed in O(N2) computing steps
and, crucially, it consists provably of one or more
independent hyperstrings (van der Helm 2004). In other
words, the arguments of S- and A-forms group by nature
into hyperstrings, so that, during the encoding, one does
not have to check whether they do form hyperstrings—
which is precisely what one would expect of an automatic
binding mechanism.
5432 6 7 8 91
xx
yy
v
w
gfa b c a b c
Fig. 6 A hyperstring. The 15 paths from vertex 1 to vertex 9
represent normal strings; for instance, the path along vertices 1, 3, 4,
5, 9 represents the string xcfw. Characteristic of hyperstrings is that
the substring sets represented by hypersubstrings are either com-
pletely identical or completely disjoint, that is, never something in
between. Here, as indicated in gray, the substring sets p(1,4) and
p(5,8) are identical: the paths from vertex 1 to vertex 4 represent the
same substrings (i.e., abc, ay, and xc) as those represented by the
paths from vertex 5 to vertex 8
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Furthermore, Fig. 7b shows that a small change in the
input string may imply that substring sets represented by
hypersubstrings turn from completely identical to com-
pletely disjoint. This illustrates that substring sets repre-
sented by hypersubstrings are either identical or disjoint,
which implies that a hyperstring can be treated as if it were
a single normal string. More specifically, it implies that all
O(2N) S- or A-arguments in a hyperstring can be recoded
simultaneously as if only one S- or A-argument were
concerned, that is, in one go or, as I call it, in a transparallel
fashion. For instance, the hyperstring in Fig. 7a can be seen
as a string h1h2. . .h9 in which the substrings h1. . .h4 and
h6. . .h9 are identical because the substrings sets p(1,5) and
p(6,10) are identical. This implies that the string h1h2. . .h9
can be recoded into the S-form S½ðh1. . .h4Þ; ðh5Þ, without
bothering about the different options h1. . .h4 stands for
(i.e., as if only one option were concerned).
Here, h1. . .h4 stands for the substring set comprising
(a)(b)(a)(b), (aba)(b), and (a)(bab), so that S½ðh1. . .h4Þ; ðh5Þ
stands for the S-forms S[((a)(b)(a)(b)), ((f))], S[((aba)(b)),
((f))], and S[((a)(bab)), ((f))]. Eventually, one of these initial
options may have to be selected, but also my selection method
is indifferent to the number of these options (see below). The
crucial point thus is that these options never have to be pro-
cessed separately.
Hence, the underlying idea is that the visual system is
sensitive to specific regularities (determined by identity
relationships between parts), and that similar regularities
automatically yield (or are bound into) hyperstring-like
assemblies which allow these similar regularities to be
hierarchically recoded in a transparallel fashion. Notice
that this yields the combination of combinatorial capacity
and speed the perceptual organization process is believed
to have. Furthermore, notice that the hierarchically recur-
sive recoding of hyperstrings yields a tree of hyperstrings,
which represents all possible codes (of only the input
string) in a hierarchical distributed representation. The final
step then is to backtrace this hyperstring tree to select a
most simple code of the input string.
Feature selection
In section ‘‘Recurrent feature selection’’, I used the analogy
of the cascade formed by a fountain under increasing water
pressure, to illustrate what I think is the role of recurrent
processing in the perceptual organization process. To
recall, as the feedforward sweep progresses along ascend-
ing connections, each passed level in the visual hierarchy
forms the starting point of integrative recurrent processing
along descending connections. This yields a gradual
buildup from partial percepts at lower levels in the visual
hierarchy to complete percepts near the top end of the
visual hierarchy. The model proceeds in the same way.
Already during the buildup of the hyperstring tree by the
intertwined subprocesses of feature encoding and feature
binding, the subprocess of feature selection starts to select
most simple codes of increasingly larger (hyper)substrings,
to select eventually a most simple code of the entire input
string. This selection mechanism is implemented by
applying, to each hyperstring, the O(N3) all-pairs version of
Dijkstra’s (1959) O(N2) shortest path method (cf. Cormen
et al. 1994; van der Helm and Leeuwenberg 1986). This is
the method which, as I mentioned earlier and as I illustrate
in section ‘‘Distributed processing’’, is comparable to
selection by activation spreading in connectionist models.
It is true that the encoding of a (hyper)string yields
candidate subcodes of its (hyper)substrings, which in case
of a hyperstring, add to the options represented initially in
the hyperstring (see previous subsection). However, the
intertwined selection of most simple subcodes implies that,
no matter the number of these initial options, the maximum
number of options in case of a hyperstring remains the
same as in case of a single normal string. Hence, the
transparallel treatment of those initial options also allows
the selection mechanism to deal with a hyperstring as if it
were a single normal string. In other words, the mechanism
to select different features preserves the combination of
high combinatorial capacity and high speed yielded by the
transparallel recoding of similar features.
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Fig. 7 Hyperstrings of symmetry arguments. a The hyperstring
representing the arguments of all S-forms into which the string
ababfababgbabafbaba can be encoded. b The hyperstring
representing the arguments of all S-forms into which the slightly
different string ababfababgbabafabab can be encoded. The substring
sets p(1,5) and p(6,10) are identical in (a) but disjoint in (b)
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As said, full formal and tractability details can be found
in van der Helm (2004), but to sum up, for a hyperstring on
N nodes, the all-substrings identification requires O(N2)
computing steps. Furthermore, the construction of all
hyperstrings representing S- and A-arguments requires
O(N3) steps, that is, O(N2) steps for each of O(N) distrib-
uted representations. Finally, the all-pairs shortest path
method requires O(N3) steps. Thus, for each hyperstring in
the hyperstring tree, O(N3) steps are required. The depth of
the hierarchical recursion is O(log N), so that the total
process requires O(N3?log N) steps.
This contrasts very favorably with the superexponential
O(2N log N) amount of work a naive algorithm would
require. Due to the factor log N, the model should probably
be qualified as weakly exponential or near-tractable, but
the O(N3?log N) is a generous worst-case upperbound, and
in the average case, this factor log N hardly seems a
problem. One could also restrict the hierarchical depth to
the number of hierarchical levels in the visual hierarchy in
the brain (see section ‘‘The visual hierarchy’’), which
would yield a fully tractable model.
Towards a pluralist account
Above, starting from a representational approach, I dis-
cussed an algorithmic model which is neurally plausible in
that it incorporates the intertwined but functionally dis-
tinguishable subprocesses of feature encoding, feature
binding, and feature selection. A pivotal point now is that
this model has additional value in that it suggests that
transparallel processing by hyperstrings provides a com-
putational account of synchronization in transient neural
assemblies—which complements DST research into this
phenomenon. Even if details of this proposal turn out to be
controversial, I think its pluralist nature indicates a prom-
ising direction for research in cognitive (neuro)science. To
substantiate this, I next give a pragmatic line-up of meta-
theoretical considerations which now and again expand on
traditional views in a way that, in my view, is appropriate
to relate representational, connectionist, and DST approa-
ches to each other. First, I discuss philosophical metaphors
of cognition; then, I discuss Marr’s (1982/2010) paradig-
matic levels of description; finally, I discuss generic forms
of processing to position the ones in my model.
Metaphors of cognition
Reality is something we experience subjectively. People
may agree something is an objective reality, but this
agreement is based on shared subjective experiences. Like
traditional story-telling and religion, science is basically an
endeavor to understand or control what many people
experience as reality, using metaphors whether or not
expressed in concrete theories and models. The idea that
science is about useful metaphors instead of objective
truths may be uncomfortable, but to vision scientists in
particular, it is evident that reality is in the eye of the
beholder (cf. Lyons 1977; Socrates, 469–399 BC).
The currently dominant but often challenged metaphor
in cognitive science is the computer metaphor. It is related
to Putnam’s (1961/1980) computational theory of mind
which, in the tradition of functionalism, promotes the idea
that the workings of the mind can be understood in terms of
information processing defined as computation, that is,
as the conversion of an input by a set of rules into an
output (see also, e.g., Edelman 2008b; Fodor 1981, 1997
2001; Haugeland 1982; Newell and Simon 1972; Pylyshyn
1984).
Opponents of this idea usually argue that the brain is a
dynamic physical system and that the mind should be
described accordingly (e.g., Smolensky 1988; van Gelder
and Port 1995). However, having been trained in both, I see
differences but no opposition. Some dynamicists, and
perhaps even some computationalists, may interpret com-
putationalism as assuming that the brain really manipulates
discrete symbols, but as I argue next, this interpretation
mistakes modeling tools for the things being modeled.
First, to be clear, the usage of symbols is inherent to all
formal modeling, also within dynamic systems approaches.
The very idea of formalization is that things, at a certain
semantic level, are labeled by symbols—not for the sake of
it, but to capture potentially relevant relationships between
these things. For instance, in physics, formulas like New-
ton’s F = ma are not assumed to be real things in nature
but are merely tools to describe allegedly relevant rela-
tionships between allegedly relevant things in nature.
Furthermore, even within the same research domain, for-
mal models may differ in modeling tools, but this is often
merely because some tools are more convenient than others
to investigate potentially relevant relationships between
things at the chosen semantic level.
Second, in my view, computationalism does not assume
that the brain manipulates discrete symbols (which, to me,
would be as odd as assuming that nature applies formulas
like Newton’s F = ma). It merely uses conversion rules as
formal tools to model the semantic structure of relatively
stable cognitive states—independently of how the brain
goes physically from one state to the next. These physical
transitions, in turn, are modeled in dynamicism using other
formal tools, namely, differential equations. Hence,
whereas computationalism focuses on semantic structure,
dynamicism focuses on physical change. This is analogous
to the difference between the semantic structure of a
computer algorithm, on the one hand, and the electrical
currents in a computer, on the other hand.
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Indeed, already before the dynamics versus computation
debate began, Neisser (1967) characterized cognition as a
dynamic information-processing system whose mental
operations might be described in computational terms. In
other words, instead of either dynamics or computation, it
is both, and theories about either aspect may contribute
equally to a more comprehensive understanding of cogni-
tion as a whole, precisely because they address different
aspects. One might object that they use different tools and
metaphors, but this is precisely one of the challenges which
I, also in this article on perceptual organization, aim to
overcome to understand cognition as a whole (see also
Mitchell 1998).
For instance, thanks to Gestalt psychology (Koffka
1935; Ko¨hler, 1920; Wertheimer 1912, 1923), it is nowa-
days commonly accepted that a percept is a relatively
stable cognitive state which arises during a dynamic neural
process. Initially, representational theory focused on the
informational content of such stable cognitive states, and
later, DST focused on the dynamics of the neural transi-
tions from any one state to the next—of course, insight in
both aspects is needed for a full understanding of percep-
tual organization. Connectionism is, in many respects, in
between representational theory and DST, and as men-
tioned, all three approaches nowadays tend to find their
roots in the Gestaltist motto that the whole is something
else than the sum of its parts. That is, all three approaches
aim to account for nonlinear behavior, meaning that a small
change in the input may yield a dramatic change in the
output. This is often presented as a trade-mark of DST, but
it also holds for many connectionist and representational
models (including SIT’s model).
To return to the computer metaphor, it is of course just a
metaphor, and by its metaphorical nature, it is about gen-
eral processing principles rather than about specific process
instantiations. Yet, related to the latter, I would like to
make the following distinction between a narrow version
(as the metaphor sometimes is interpreted by opponents)
and a broad version (as the metaphor usually is interpreted
by proponents):
Narrow computer metaphor: The digital computer is
a model of the neural brain.
Broad computer metaphor (a.k.a. information-pro-
cessing metaphor): Information processing by com-
puters is a model of cognitive processing by the brain.
The narrow computer metaphor, on the one hand, fol-
lows the tradition of comparing the brain to the most
sophisticated machine known at the time. In the past,
machines such as the clock and the steam-engine had
served as model of the brain, and in the twentieth century,
it was the computer’s turn to serve as model. A concrete
model within this tradition aims to capture the serial
development over time of a system that, as a whole, goes
from one state to the next. Such a system may, for instance,
be a single neuron, or a group of neurons, or the brain as a
whole. DST proponents may tend to reject the computer
metaphor (e.g., van Gelder and Port 1995), but DST
models do fit in this tradition: as I discussed in section
‘‘The dynamics of synchronization’’, DST employs differ-
ential equations, which describe the strictly serial process
by which a system goes from one state to the next.
The broad computer metaphor, on the other hand,
suggests that cognitive processing can be modeled use-
fully in terms of information close to the everyday
meaning of the word; these are also the terms in which
computers can be programmed to process things. Hence,
in contrast to previous metaphors, the broad computer
metaphor does not refer to the hardware principle that the
brain is a physical system, but it refers to software prin-
ciples implemented in the brain to allow for cognition
(see also Neisser 1967).
Such software principles are, in representational
models, modeled by regularity extracting operations to
get structured representations, and in connectionist
models, by activation spreading through a network. Such
a network typically is a distributed representation which,
via combinations of connected pieces of information,
represents many wholes. This concept stems from graph
theory (see Harary 1994), and it is powerful in that the
metaphor of interacting pieces can be used to efficiently
evaluate many wholes (for more details, see section
‘‘Distributed processing’’). Notice, however, that also my
representationally inspired algorithmic model employs
distributed representations (see section ‘‘A transparallel
processing model’’).
The latter suggests that the concept of distributed
representations may bridge the gap between representa-
tional theory and connectionism. Furthermore, as I dis-
cussed in section ‘‘The dynamics of synchronization’’,
synchronization in networks is a topic in DST. It is true
that DST models the states of such a network as a whole
rather than individual interpretations represented by those
states, but implicitly, such a network can also be seen as a
distributed representation. This suggests that the concept
of distributed representations may bridge the gap between
connectionism and DST as well (see also, e.g., Spencer
et al. 2009). Indeed, I think that, regarding cognitive
architecture, distributed representations constitute the
proverbial coin, with DST highlighting its neuronal side
and representational theory highlighting its cognitive
side. This may leave less room for connectionism as a
theory, but it asserts connectionist modeling as a most
powerful tool to implement realistic simulations of ideas
within DST and representational theory (see also section
‘‘Connectionist modeling’’).
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Levels of description
Proponents of representational theory, connectionism, or
DST may have criticized the others for not telling the
whole story, but I actually think that none of these
approaches alone tells the whole story. However, I also
think that, together, they might tell a more complete story.
For instance, as indicated above, connectionist modeling
has both a representational side and a dynamic systems
side, which suggests that the three approaches form a
continuum (cf. Bem and Looren de Jong 2006). In other
words, I think that the three approaches are complementary
rather than mutually exclusive.
This agrees with Marr’s (1982/2010) distinction between
three separate but complementary levels of description of
information processing systems:
1. The computational level—at which the goal of a
system is specified in terms of systematicities in the
system’s output as a function of its input. Applied to
the visual system, this level concerns the question of
what logic defines the nature of resulting mental
representations of incoming stimuli.
2. The algorithmic level—at which the method of a
system is specified in terms of the mechanisms that
transform the system’s input into its output. Applied to
the visual system, this level concerns the question of
how its input and output are represented and how one
is transformed in the other.
3. The implementational level—at which the means of a
system is specified in terms of the hardware of the
system. Applied to the visual system, this level
concerns the question of how those representations
and transformations are neurally realized.
To avoid misunderstandings, notice that Marr’s distinction
is a general distinction which can be applied recursively to
any part of any system (or to any part of any model thereof)
and that, just as Marr did, I apply to the visual system.
The labels Marr assigned to these levels were inspired
by the rise of computers: computer programmers are well
aware of the problem to compute something (the goal) by
way of an algorithm (the method) implemented in certain
hardware (the means). Others assigned different labels to
basically the same levels. For instance, Dennett (1978)
labeled them similarly by the intentional stance, the design
stance, and the physical stance; Glass et al. (1979) labeled
them similarly by the levels of content, form, and medium;
and Pylyshyn (1984) labeled them similarly by the
semantic level, the syntactic level, and the physical level.
In fact, the relevance of the distinction between goal,
method, and means was already emphasized by Aristotle
(384–322 BC), and indeed, whatever the labels are, the
distinction is relevant in many domains. For instance,
cooks are well aware of the problem to prepare a dish (the
goal) by way of a recipe (the method) using certain
ingredients (the means). Furthermore, in evolution theory,
Darwin (1859) specified the goal (i.e., survival), Mendel
(1866/1965) specified the method (i.e., heredity rules), and
Watson and Crick (1953) specified the means (i.e., DNA).
The foregoing illustrates that the computational, algo-
rithmic, and implementational levels yield descriptions of
different aspects, and that they are complementary in that,
together, they may explain how the goal is reached by a
method that is allowed by the means. Cognitive
(neuro)science still has a long way to go before it may
arrive at a comprehensive theory which, even then, might
well accommodate explanations at different levels of
description. For instance, neuroscientists may argue that
near-death and love experiences are the result of bio-
chemical processes in the brain—and they may be right—
but this does not yet do justice to people’s conscious
experiences which call for another story. In other words, I
am open to what is called a metaphysical (or ontological)
reading of pluralism (which assumes that a ‘‘grand unifying
theory’’ is possible), but for the moment, I adopt an
explanatory (or epistemological) reading of pluralism—
which, more pragmatically, focuses on differences and
parallels between existing explanations at different levels
of description to see whether and how they might be
combined (see also, e.g., Jilk et al. 2008).
Of course, it remains perfectly legitimate to focus on
only the one or two levels of description that are most
relevant to a research question at hand. Yet, also then, it is
fruitful to have an eye for ideas that are compatible with all
three levels—as I experienced in research on symmetry
perception (see Csatho´, van der Vloed and van der Helm
2003; Treder and van der Helm 2007; van der Helm and
Leeuwenberg 1999, 2004). Furthermore, there are no strict
borders between the three levels, but the distinction is
useful not only to position ideas in the total field of cog-
nitive science but also to assess whether ideas formulated
at different levels, and thereby perhaps seemingly opposed,
might yet be compatible.
Representational theory, connectionism, and DST are
not confined to one level of description each, but their
operating bases can be said to be the computational level,
the algorithmic level, and the implementational level,
respectively. That is, all three approaches are (at least
verbally) concerned with all three levels, but as a rule,
representational models start from ideas about the nature of
mental representations, connectionist models from ideas
about the transformations from input to output, and DST
models from ideas about the neural realizations. This
suggests that, like Marr’s levels, also these three approa-
ches are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. As
mentioned in section ‘‘Introduction’’, I aim to go farther
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than just promoting this idea which can also be framed as
follows.
Notice that a distinction can be made between repre-
sentations and processes. The brain does not make this
distinction, as DST proponents surely emphasize, but it is a
crucial scientific distinction because it stresses that there
are two basic questions: (a) the ‘‘what’’ question, which is
the mostly computational and partly algorithmic question I
addressed in section ‘‘A representationally inspired algo-
rithmic account’’, and (b) the ‘‘how’’ question, which is the
partly algorithmic and mostly implementational question I
addressed in section ‘‘The visual hierarchy’’. This distinc-
tion reverberates the distinction which, according to Koffka
(1935), Wertheimer made between the molar (or behav-
ioral, or cognitive) and molecular (or physiological, or
neural) levels.
As Marr noted, answering the what and how questions
may be totally different endeavors, but answers to both
questions are needed for a complete understanding. For
instance, one might argue that gamma synchronization has
already been explained in some sense by the empirically
supported association with perceptual organization (see
section ‘‘Proposed meanings of synchronization’’). Side-
stepping my feeling that this association is not an expla-
nation but rather an observation to be explained, it could
indeed be said to explain synchronization in some sense,
namely, in the sense that it provides sort of an answer to the
question of what synchronization is involved in—however,
it does not answer the question of how it is involved.
Traditionally, representational models focus on the what
question, whereas DST models focus on the how question
(with, again, connectionist models somewhere in between).
Thus far, DST approaches have addressed the phenomenon
of synchronization (see section ‘‘The dynamics of syn-
chronization’’), but to my knowledge, representational
approaches have not (in section ‘‘Distributed representa-
tions’’, I discuss the few connectionist models that
addressed it). The additional value of my algorithmic
model now is that it implements a representational speci-
fication of this association with perceptual organization,
employing a special form of processing that might be the
form of cognitive processing that manifests itself by neu-
ronal synchronization.
Forms of processing
Apart from the foregoing philosophical and paradigmatic
issues, there is the metatheoretical issue of the forms of
processing a theory or model might employ in its pro-
posed process from input to output. Therefore, here, I
discuss generic forms of processing to position the ones
employed in my algorithmic model of perceptual
organization.
To be clear, I do not aim to present a detailed taxonomy.
For instance, Flynn (1972) distinguished classes of com-
puter processes involving single or multiple instruction
streams executed serially or in parallel on single or mul-
tiple data streams. Furthermore, Townsend (Townsend and
Nozawa 1995) distinguished elementary cognitive pro-
cesses, classifying them in terms of architecture, capacity,
and stopping rule. Such taxonomies are helpful but also
known to be nonexhaustive, and due to the novelty of
transparallel processing, my model does not seem to fit
neatly in existing taxonomies. Closest seems to be its
qualification, in Townsend’s terms, as an exhaustive pro-
cess using a coactive architecture yielding supercapacity—
where coactive means that input from separate parallel
channels is consolidated in a resultant common processor.
This is not only close to what hyperstrings do, but it is also
what Townsend feels is needed to account for perceptual
organization.
What both taxonomies do indicate is that, apart from the
number of processors involved, one also has to reckon with
the structure of the data operated on. I therefore begin with
the notion of distributed processing which sounds like
referring to a specific form of processing, but which rather
refers to a specific organization of data to be processed.
Distributed processing
The term distributed processing is often used to refer to a
process that, instead of being executed by one processor, is
divided over a number of processors. The latter does not
yield a reduction in the work to be done, but it may yield a
proportional reduction in the time needed—at least, if those
processors operate in parallel. For instance, in the search
for extraterrestial intelligence project (SETI), a central
computer divides the sky into parts, and it assigns each part
to a different computer which analyzes this part and which
returns its findings to the central computer. Thus, each of
the computers does only part of the total job, and the total
job is done by the computer network as a whole, which
therefore is said to perform distributed processing. Saving
time this way is of course relevant in practice, but theo-
retically, most interesting is the division of the sky into
parts, which implies that the central computer maintains a
distributed representation of the sky.
I therefore prefer to define distributed processing more
generally (i.e., independently of the number of processors
involved) as referring to a process that operates on a dis-
tributed representation of the data to be processed. Defined
this way, distributed processing can yield a reduction in
work (and, thereby, also in time): as I discuss in a moment,
there are distributed representations which a process may
exploit effectively to substantially reduce work. This is not
the case in the SETI project, but it is part and parcel of my
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algorithmic model and also of connectionist models. In
these models, the work reduction depends on the nature of
the distributed representations employed and not on the
number of processors involved. For instance, connectionist
models usually postulate networks of processors operating
in parallel. Such a network is therefore said to perform
parallel distributed processing. One might object that this
usually is sustained only by a simulation on a single seri-
ally processing computer but, though the simulation takes
extra time, this does not affect the proposed work-reducing
principles. The only difference is that, in the simulation,
the computer can be said to perform serial distributed
processing.
In general, a distributed representation is a data structure
that can be visualized by a set of interconnected nodes, in
which pieces of information are represented by the nodes,
or by the links, or by both. An example is the Internet,
which connects pieces of information stored at different
places. In the 1980s, distributed representations became
popular in cognitive science due to connectionism, but
already since the 1950s, properties and applications of
distributed representations have been studied extensively in
graph theory, which is a subdomain of both mathematics
and computer science (cf. Harary 1994).
Work-reducing distributed representations are typically
like road maps in which roads are represented by links
between nodes representing places, so that routes are rep-
resented in a distributed fashion by successive links. Dif-
ferent wholes (i.e., routes) thus share parts (i.e., roads), and
this is key to achieve a reduction in work. That is, for
N nodes, such a distributed representation typically repre-
sents O(2N) wholes by way of only O(N2) parts. A process
that has to search or select a specific whole, for instance,
may exploit this and may confine itself to evaluating the
O(N2) parts instead of the O(2N) wholes. This principle is
part and parcel of what, in computer science, informally is
called smart processing—because it typically reduces an
exponential O(2N) amount of work to a polynomial O(N2)
amount of work. For instance, suffix trees (cf. Gusfield
1997) and the data structure used in deterministic finite
automatons (Hopcroft and Ullman 1979) are, in computer
science, well-known distributed representations used in
smart search algorithms.
These smart methods can all be said to rely on inter-
actions between parts in order to arrive at wholes—which,
noteworthy, is also a central Gestalt principle. In fact, my
model implements the subprocess of feature encoding
using a smart method that implicitly uses suffix trees.
Furthermore, it implements the subprocess of feature
selection using Dijkstra’s (1959) shortest path method,
which falls in the same category of smart selection algo-
rithms as the selection by activation spreading in connec-
tionist models (see Fig. 8 for an informal connectionist
translation of Dijkstra’s method). Its implementation of the
subprocess of feature binding, however, takes the foregoing
to a new level by using hyperstrings, which enables a
reduction of exponential O(2N) amounts of work to con-
stant O(1) amounts of work. To position this form of
processing further, I next go into some more detail on the
role of distributed representations in connectionist
modeling.
Connectionist modeling
Inspired by the brain’s neural network, connectionism
entertains the idea that cognitive behavior arises from
activation spreading in a network that represents pieces of
information in its nodes, or in its links, or in both
(Churchland 1986, 2002; Churchland and Sejnowsky 1990,
1992; Smolensky 1988). The nodes are taken to be parallel
processors, each typically doing little more than (a) sum its
incoming activation, (b) change its state according to some
function of this sum, and (c) modulate the activation it
transmits as a function of some weight (cf. Fodor and
Pylyshyn 1988). Hence, each node performs only part of
the total job, and the network is therefore said to perform
parallel distributed processing.
A seminal example is McClelland and Rumelhart’s
(1981) model of word recognition. Roughly, their net-
work consists of (a) an input layer of nodes responding to
letter strokes in pictures of words, (b) an output layer of
nodes representing words, and (c) an intermediate layer of
nodes which regulate the flow of activation between the
input and output layers (in this model, these nodes rep-
resent letters, but in other models, this layer is also called
a layer of hidden nodes). When fed with a picture of a
word, activation spreads through the network until it
settles in a relatively stable state—then, the most highly
activated output node is taken to represent the word in the
picture.
Nowadays, connectionist models come in many flavors
(cf. Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2002). For instance, the
represented pieces of information may or may not be at
different levels of aggregation—if they are, as in the
example above, the network is said to be hierarchical (cf.
Miikkulainen and Dyer 1991). Furthermore, so-called
feedforward networks do not allow activation to flow in
circles, whereas so-called recurrent networks do. More-
over, in so-called localist networks, the output is given by a
node, whereas in so-called distributed networks, it is given
by a trace of successive links (or by the entire pattern of
activation). The latter distinction corresponds to Smo-
lensky’s (1988) symbolic-subsymbolic distinction and is
formally merely a matter of decomposition (Fodor and
Pylyshyn 1988; Bechtel 1994). In contrast to localist net-
works, however, distributed networks allow for a flexible
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clustering of represented ‘‘subsymbolic’’ parts into aggre-
gates representing ‘‘symbolic’’ wholes.
In applications, a network typically is first fed with
many inputs to tune its activation-spreading parameters
such that the desired outputs tend to result; this training
technique is called backpropagation. Subsequently, it is
tested by feeding it novel inputs—then, a network is said to
be robust if its performance is insensitive to small varia-
tions in the parameter setting, and if it also performs well,
it is proposed to capture a relevant systematicity in the
input domain. This systematicity may or may not be
specified explicitly, but it seems in line with the philosophy
of connectionism to say that it is an emergent property
which arises ‘‘automagically’’ from the process of activa-
tion spreading.
The foregoing shows that connectionism uses powerful
modeling tools which seem suited to simulate cognition.
However, backpropagation is basically just a form of data
fitting, which suggests that connectionism may not be suffi-
cient to explain cognition. For instance, I concur with Fodor
and Pylyshyn (1988) who argued that connectionism may
provide, at best, an account of the neural structures in which
representational cognitive architecture is implemented (see
also Bechtel 1994; Fodor and Mclaughlin 1990).
Furthermore, standard connectionism rejects the repre-
sentational idea that the brain performs regularity
T = 0 T = 1
T = 3T = 2
T = 5T = 4
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
0
1
2
3
4
5
Fig. 8 Parallel distributed processing implementation of Dijkstra’s
(1959) shortest path method to select an optimal flow path in a hilly
tube system with six distribution nodes (nodes 0,1,…,5). The fluid
used is such that it hardens within one time unit once it stops flowing.
A link between two nodes i and j is a soft tube that expands as the
fluid runs through it and consists of at most j - i straight segments
having slopes such that the fluid takes one time unit to cross a
segment. Every node has a separate outlet for each outgoing tube, but
only one inlet for all incoming tubes. An inlet has the same cross
section as one fluid-filled tube, so, when the fluid reaches the inlet
through one or more tubes, the remaining tubes are automatically
sealed off. At time T = 0, the fluid starts to be poured into node 0 and
reaches node 2 at time T = 1, sealing off the tube between nodes 1
and 2. At time T = 2, the fluid has filled this dead-end tube, and the
then nonflowing fluid therein has hardened at time T = 3. By then,
the fluid has also already reached node 5. After that, there is still some
filling of dead-end tubes and hardening of the fluid therein, but at
times T C 5, the only remaining flow path consists of a minimal
number of segments
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extraction to get structured representations of incoming
stimuli. This connectionist stance implies, as mentioned
earlier, that activation spreading is merely a mechanism to
select outputs from a pre-defined output space for all
possible inputs. Considering all three subprocesses that are
believed to take place in the visual hierarchy (see section
‘‘The visual hierarchy’’), however, I think it is more
plausible that, preceding such a selection, feedforward
encoding and horizontal binding create an output space for
only the input at hand. This is what my model does, and as
I discuss in section ‘‘Distributed representations’’, this does
not exclude connectionist modeling, but it does call for a
more flexible version thereof.
Finally, neuronal synchronization occurs in a neural
network that can be said to perform parallel distributed
processing. DST research focuses on how synchronization
might arise in such a network (see section ‘‘The dynamics
of synchronization’’), and this is also the natural way in
which connectionism might look at it. This, however,
ignores that synchronization reflects a processing mode
which, at least in representational terms, seems to yield a
combinatorial capacity and speed that surpass the capacity
and speed of standard parallel distributed processing (see
section ‘‘Proposed meanings of synchronization’’). This
issue touches upon the question—discussed next—of how
a process may operate on data whether or not organized in
a distributed fashion.
From subserial to transparallel processing
Many everyday processes are hybrid in that they involve a
combination of serial and parallel processing (see also
Wolfe 2003). For instance, in a relay race, the teams run in
parallel (i.e., simultaneously), but the members of each
team run serially (i.e., one after the other). Likewise, at the
checkout in a supermarket, the cashiers work in parallel,
but each cashier processes customer carts serially. As I
discuss here, however, there is more to processing than
this traditional dichotomy between serial and parallel
processing.
I begin with the observation that, at the checkout in a
supermarket, an additional form of processing can be dis-
tinguished. That is, not only are the cashiers working in
parallel, each cashier processing customer carts serially,
but the different carts are also presented serially by dif-
ferent customers. This example indicates that, under
appropriate specifications of ‘‘items’’ and ‘‘processors’’, not
just two but at least three forms of processing can be dis-
tinguished (see also Fig. 9):
1. subserial processing, in which items are processed one
after the other by different processors;
2. serial processing, in which items are processed one
after the other by one processor;
3. parallel processing, in which items are processed
simultaneously by different processors.
The supermarket example illustrates that these are three
natural forms of processing—which probably occur also in
the brain (where a processor may be defined by a neuron or
by a group of neurons). Furthermore, the line-up of these
three forms of processing in Fig. 9 suggests the existence
of the form of processing I defined by:
4. transparallel processing, in which items are processed
simultaneously by one processor.
Transparallel processing may look like science-fiction, but
as I argued in section ‘‘A transparallel processing model’’,
it is mathematically sound and has already been imple-
mented in my model of perceptual organization. In fact, as
I illustrate next, it is also a natural form of processing.
Imagine that, for some odd reason, the longest pencil
among a number of pencils is to be selected (see Fig. 10a).
Then, one or many persons could measure the lengths of
the pencils in a (sub)serial or parallel fashion—after which
the longest pencil can be selected by comparing the out-
comes of the measurements (see Fig. 10b). A much smarter
method, however, would be if one person gathers all pen-
cils in one bundle and places the bundle upright on a
table—after which the longest pencil can be selected in a
glance (see Fig. 10c). The smart part of this (of course also
hybrid) method is that, once gathered, the pencils are not
treated as separate items by one or many processors (here,
persons) in a (sub)serial or parallel fashion, but that they
are treated in a transparallel fashion, that is, simultaneously
by one processor as if they constitute one item (i.e., a
bundle).
To be clear, this example should not be confused with
Dewdney’s (1984) spaghetti metaphor which illustrates a
sorting algorithm. My example illustrates that, in some
cases, items can be gathered in one bin after which they can
be treated simultaneously as if only one item were
One item
at a time
Many items
at a time
Many
processors
Serial
processing
Parallel
processingprocessing
Subserial
processor
One
processing
Transparallel
Fig. 9 Forms of processing defined by numbers of processors and
items processed at a time
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concerned. In my model of perceptual organization, such
transparallel processing has a positive efficiency effect on
feature selection and integration, but it is employed pri-
marily to efficiently recode similar features. To this end, as
I discussed in section ‘‘A representationally inspired
algorithmic account’’, those similar features are gathered in
distributed representations called hyperstrings, which
allows those features to be recoded in one go, that is, in a
transparallel fashion. Hence, the binding role of the bundle
in the pencil example is analogous to the binding role of
hyperstrings in my model, but hyperstrings serve a more
sophisticated purpose, namely, transparallel recoding of
similar features. This transparallel recoding by way of
hyperstrings can be seen as a special form of distributed
processing, and as I argue in the next section, it leads to a
concrete pluralist picture of cognitive architecture.
Cognitive architecture
Going from brain to model, my model of perceptual
organization is neurally plausible in that it incorporates the
intertwined but functionally distinguishable subprocesses
of feature encoding, feature binding, and feature selec-
tion—which, in neuroscience, are believed to take place in
the visual hierarchy (see Fig. 5). To recall, the subprocess
of feature encoding reflects an initial feedforward tuning of
visual areas to features to which the visual system is sen-
sitive; the intertwined subprocess of feature selection
reflects a recurrent integration of different features into
percepts; and, in between, the subprocess of feature bind-
ing reflects a horizontal binding of similar features. The
latter subprocess may be a relatively underexposed topic in
neuroscience, but it can be seen as the neuronal counterpart
of the regularity extraction which, in representational the-
ory, is proposed to lead to structured mental representa-
tions. Furthermore, at least in my model, it is key to allow
for transparallel processing by hyperstrings—which, to
my knowledge, is the first representationally inspired
mechanism proposed to do justice to both the high com-
binatorial capacity and the high speed of the perceptual
organization process.
Inversely, going from model to brain, this transparallel
mechanism may fill a gap in the understanding of neuronal
synchronization. The model suggests that hyperstrings can
be seen as formal counterparts of the transient horizontal
assemblies of synchronized neurons which, in neurosci-
ence, are thought to be responsible for binding similar
features. Thereby, it also suggests that the synchronization
in these assemblies can be seen as a manifestation of
transparallel processing. In this sense, transparallel pro-
cessing by hyperstrings provides a computational expla-
nation of the dynamic phenomenon of synchronization in
transient neural assemblies. This proposal of course needs
further investigation (see also below), but as said, for one
thing, it does justice to both the high combinatorial
capacity and the high speed of the perceptual organization
process.
Although my model was developed starting from a
representational approach, it reflects a truly pluralist
account in the spirit of Marr (1982/2010). First, it tran-
scends traditional definitions of representational and
connectionist approaches, in that it puts the representa-
tional idea that cognition relies on regularity extraction to
get structured representations in a more dynamic per-
spective together with a more flexible version of the
connectionist idea that cognition relies on activation
spreading through a network. Second, its transparallel
mechanism relates plausibly to neuronal synchronization,
so that it also honors the DST idea that cognition relies on
dynamic changes in the brain’s neural state. To summa-
rize this like I did in section ‘‘Metaphors of cognition’’, I
think that, regarding cognitive architecture, distributed
representations (as highlighted in connectionism) consti-
tute the proverbial coin, with DST highlighting its neu-
ronal side and representational theory highlighting its
cognitive side. To discuss this further, I first revisit dis-
tributed representations.
Fig. 10 Transparallel pencil selection. a Suppose the longest pencil
is to be selected from among a number of pencils. b Then, one or
many persons could measure the lengths of the pencils in a subserial,
serial, or parallel fashion—after which the longest pencil can be
selected by comparing the outcomes of the measurements. c A
smarter, transparallel, method would be if one person gathers all
pencils in one bundle and places the bundle upright on a table—after
which the longest pencil can be selected in a glance
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Distributed representations
In connectionist terms, the hyperstrings in my model are
distributed networks in which nodes represent locations in
a localist fashion, while links represent spatial features
(i.e., visual regularities) in a distributed fashion. Further-
more, they are the constituents of hyperstring trees which,
in connectionist terms, are hierarchical networks. In such a
hyperstring tree, a hyperstring is constituted by horizontal
links representing featural information at some level of
aggregation, and it is anchored vertically by the spatial
information in the nodes. Moreover, backtracing a hyper-
string tree to select a most simple code is a recurrent
process. Hence, my model shares various characteristics
with standard connectionist modeling, and in fact, a
hyperstring tree corresponds to a recurrent hierarchical
distributed network yielding a most highly activated trace
of links as output.
Though beyond the scope of this article, it would be
interesting to implement a formal connectionist version of
this model. Inherent to the idea of complementarity, such a
connectionist version does not have to be a literal transla-
tion. For instance, the strength of outcomes usually is a
discrete variable in representational models and a contin-
uous variable in connectionist models. This difference,
however, seems without much consequence because, in the
end, the ranking of outcomes is what matters most.
A more delicate point concerns neuronal synchroniza-
tion which, to my knowledge, is a topic addressed by only
few connectionist models (e.g., Hummel and Biederman
1992; Hummel and Holyoak 2003, 2005; Shastri and
Ajjanagadde 1993). These models do not associate syn-
chronization with binding of similar features, but with
integration of different features. The neuroscientific evi-
dence is admittedly still too scanty to decide, but it may
well be associated with both. For instance, different sets of
similar features might be represented in different assem-
blies of synchronized neurons, and the integration of dif-
ferent features might be reflected by simultaneous
synchronization of these assemblies. Anyway, notice that
my model does associate it with both. It suggests that
synchronization already starts pre-selection with the bind-
ing of similar features (reflecting a regularity extraction
that is absent in standard connectionist modeling) into
hyperstring-like assemblies of synchronized neurons,
whose combinatorial capacity is primarily exploited to
efficiently recode similar features but, subsequently, also to
efficiently select and integrate different features.
Furthermore, a major difference with standard connec-
tionist modeling is that the hierarchical distributed network
in my model does not refer to a relatively rigid neural
network but to a cognitive network that shapes itself flex-
ibly to the input at hand (which implies an efficient usage
of storage resources without increasing the order of mag-
nitude of work to be done; see the end of section ‘‘A
representationally inspired algorithmic account’’). Just as I
implemented my model in a computer, this flexible cog-
nitive network is assumed to be implemented in the brain.
As I discuss next, precisely this triggers a concrete picture
of cognitive architecture.
From neurons to gnosons
As I mentioned in section ‘‘Introduction’’, the idea that
cognition is a dynamic process of self-organization is not
new, and the idea that transient assemblies of synchronized
neurons are the building blocks of cognition is not new
either. That is, nowadays, it is widely accepted that neu-
ronal synchronization is a cognitively relevant phenome-
non, and gamma synchronization in particular has been
associated strongly with perceptual organization (see sec-
tion ‘‘Proposed meanings of synchronization’’). Thus far,
however, this idea lacked a computational explanation. My
transparallel processing model now opens a concrete plu-
ralist perspective on the cognitive architecture of percep-
tual organization. That is, it suggests the following picture.
Perceptual organization is mediated by a self-organiz-
ing, hierarchical, cognitive network which arises in the
neural network of the brain. This network shapes itself to
the input at hand and consists of hyperstring-like neural
assemblies which signal their presence by synchronization
of the neurons involved. These assemblies, or gnosons as I
call them, are formed automatically by the extraction of
regularities to which the visual system is sensitive. They
represent similar regularities in a distributed fashion, sup-
plying high combinatorial capacity and high speed by
allowing many similar regularities to be hierarchically
recoded in one go, that is, as if only one feature were
concerned. These assemblies, with the high combinatorial
capacity and high speed they supply, remain effective
during the selection and integration of different features
into percepts.
Of course, my model does not cover everything, and I
cordially invite other researchers to provide additional
input on how gnoson-forming regularity extraction might
take place in the neural network of the brain, for instance.
My present point, however, is that my model gives rise to a
picture of flexible cognitive architecture constituted by
self-organizing gnoson hierarchies arising in the relatively
rigid neural architecture of the brain.
To conclude, the concept of gnosons may be grounded
further as follows. Pascal (1658/1950) observed that a
particular description of things usually reflects just one of
an indefinite number of semantically related nominalistic
levels in a hierarchy of possible descriptions. That is,
concepts used at some level build on (or can be
Cogn Process (2012) 13:13–40 35
123
decomposed into) lower-level concepts and form the
building blocks for (or can be combined into) higher-level
concepts. Both upward and downward in such a hierarchy
of descriptions, there always seems to be room for addi-
tional levels, each with its own new concepts. For instance,
particle physics currently takes quarks as the concepts at
the lowest description level in physics, but superstring
theory is an attempt to model them, at a still lower level, as
vibrations of tiny supersymmetric strings (see Greene
2003).
Going upward, from quarks to consciousness, there are
various levels of description, among which are the levels of
atoms, molecules, and neurons. These concepts are taken to
stand for the functional entities, or ‘‘processors’’, at their
respective levels. In between neurons and consciousness,
there is cognition, and it seems fair to assume that, size-
wise, cognitive processors must lie between individual
neurons and the brain as a whole. For instance, in the past,
the perceptron (a small single-layered network; Rosenblatt
1958) and the cognitron (a small multi-layered network;
Fukushima 1975) have been proposed as formal counter-
parts of cognitive processing units. This line of thinking is
continued by my proposal to conceive of input-dependent
hyperstrings as formal counterparts of gnosons and to
conceive of gnosons as constituents of flexible cognitive
architecture.
Conclusion
Cognitive (neuro)science still has a long way to go before it
may arrive at a comprehensive theory of perceptual orga-
nization, let alone of cognition as a whole. As I argued in
this article, however, such a comprehensive theory might
be obtained by combining complementary insights from
representational theory, connectionism, and DST. Inherent
to the idea of complementarity, insights from these dif-
ferent approaches do not have to be literal translations of
each other. Rather, they might concern the different, but
complementary, questions of (a) what is the nature of the
outcomes of a process; (b) how does the process proceed;
and (c) how are the process and its outcomes neurally
realized.
In search for answers, I started from a representationally
inspired algorithmic model which (a) is neurally plausible
in that it implements intertwined but functionally distin-
guishable subprocesses which, in neuroscience, are
believed to take place in the visual hierarchy in the brain;
and (b) suggests that synchronization in transient neural
assemblies in the visual hierarchy is a manifestation of
transparallel processing. In the model, this special form of
processing relies on hyperstrings, that is, special distributed
representations which allow many similar features to be
recoded simultaneously as if only one feature were con-
cerned. A naturally following suggestion is that those
temporarily synchronized neural assemblies, or gnosons as
I call them, are constituents of flexible cognitive architec-
ture implemented in the relatively rigid neural architecture
of the brain.
This proposal qualifies rather than challenges existing
ideas about neuronal synchronization in the visual hierar-
chy, but its specifics of course need further investigation.
Furthermore, I feel it is open to modulating effects of
attention, but also this needs further investigation. For one
thing, however, this proposal sketches a concrete pluralist
picture of a neurally plausible cognitive architecture which
accounts for the high combinatorial capacity and high
speed of the human perceptual organization process.
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